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1. Introduction 
Ludwik Fleck’s contribution to the sociology and philosophy of science has gone almost 
unnoticed to the present day (see Sady 2017). Although his ideas about the development 
of scientific knowledge as a collective effort organised in ‘thought collectives’ 
(‘Denkkollektive’) based on shared ‘thought styles’ (‘Denkstile’) may have been 
elaborated and honed in Thomas S. Kuhn’s works on scientific revolutions and paradigm 
shifts and those of Imre Lakatos on scientific research programs (srp), Fleck’s work is 
still insightful beyond Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ contributions, not so much with respect to 
what triggers scientific progress but rather what impedes the correction of scientific 
deceptions.  
While Kuhn and Lakatos built on the rationality of the scientific community not to follow 
paradigmatic lines or adhere to scientific research programs defeated by empirical 
falsification or the proof of logical inconsistency or having entered the ‘state of 
degeneration’, Fleck was more concerned with the sociological forces that explain the 
resilience of ideas and what today we would call ‘fake knowledge’ even in the face of 
mounting evidence that does not fit the established wisdom. 
In the following, Fleck’s philosophy and sociology of science will be briefly outlined in 
order to establish a ‘theory of the resilience of scientific misapprehension’. This theory 
will be tested against the development of modern neoclassical economics by singling out 
a case of extreme deviation of theoretical prediction from empirical evidence: minimum 
wages’ impact on employment.   
2. Ludwik Fleck and the ‘harmony of deception’ 
Ludwik Fleck was convinced that there are no such things as ‘objective knowledge’ or 
only ‘facts’ which constitute a true understandig of the real world. Rather, facts, like 
knowledge, are always socially constructed in the sense that what we see (as a fact) or 
know (as ‘truth’) depends on the way we look at it. And in order to be plainly able to see 
something when we look at it, we need a ‘pre- or proto-idea’ (‘Prä- oder Ur-Idee’) which 
is neither wrong nor false but merely a devise with which to construct reality. 
Observations and reflections under the influence of such pre- or proto-ideas develop into 
a ‘thought style’ (‚Denkstil‘) which then can be defined  
as (the readiness for) directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective 
assimilation of what has been so perceived (Fleck 1979: 99).  
As distinct from the social constructivists, Fleck must not necessarily reject the existence 
of a unique social reality independent of the observer, but the way the observer sees and 
explains such a unique social reality always depends on the particular heuristic devices 
and hermeneutics that constitute a ‘thought style’. A social element comes in because a 
certain ‘thought style’ can produce ‘facts’ and ‘knowledge’ in any meaningful way only 
if such ‘facts’ and ‘knowledge’ are accepted by more than one individual, i.e. a group of 
people or, more generally, a collective which shares the same way of seeing and 
explaining: a ‘thought collective’ (‘Denkkollektiv’). 
In order to attribute to a certain ‘thought style’ the power of generating and developing 
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facts and knowledge that assume scientific status, it must not only be shared by a 
collective of scientists (which Fleck calls the ‘esoteric circle’) and laymen accepting the 
outcome as scientific wisdom ( the ‘exoteric circle’) but must also be stable or last some 
time. Therefore, the thought collective must develop a certain solidarity to the thought 
style Fleck calls the ‘collective mood’ and which can be described as  
an intellectual taste and a notion of what counts as a good result and appropriate 
path to it (von Sass 2016: 75).  
The stronger such bonds of solidarity, the stronger the ‘thought compulsion’ 
(‘stilgemäßer Denkzwang’) emanating from it, the more stable a thought style will be. Its 
flipside is the neglect and rejection of everything – from facts to ideas or theories 
originating from alternative ‘pre- or proto-ideas’ – that does not conform to the thought 
style of the thought collective. This kind of group pressure may be harmless as long as 
membership of a thought collective is entirely voluntarily (i.e. independent of any social 
or institutional inducement or pressure) and there are different thought collectives 
entertaining different thought styles. Yet if a scientific discipline does not allow a 
plurality of different thought styles but enforces a unitarian-monistic approach de-
legitimizing every thought style but one, the likelihood of what Fleck calls ‘‚a harmony 
of deception’ (‘Harmonie der Täuschungen’)1 is high.  
If tenacity is a necessary pre-condition for thought styles to become powerful in the sense 
that it creates explanations and narratives which are regarded as scientific truth by both 
the esoteric and exoteric circles and, indeed, as common knowledge, collective mood and 
thought compulsion must be effective. Although the collective mood may have very 
different origins and modes of operation, thought compulsion is similar regardless of 
thought style:  
Once a structurally complete and closed system of opinions consisting of many 
details and relations has been formed, it offers enduring resistance to anything that 
contradicts it:[…] (1) A contradiction to the system appears unthinkable. (2) What 
does not fit into the system remains unseen; (3) alternatively, if it is noticed either it 
is kept secret or (4) laborious efforts are made to explain an exception in terms that 
do not contradict the system. (5) Despite the legitimate claims of contradictory 
views, one tends to see, describe, or even illustrate those circumstances, which 
corroborate current views and thereby give them substance. (Fleck 1979: 27) 
The more pervasive the collective mood is, the stronger the thought compulsion will be, 
resulting in a strong resilience of the thought style and, possibly, scientific 
misapprehention or a ‘harmony of deception’. In the following section, the economic 
discipline will be explored with respect to its collective mood and its thought compulsion 
by referring to a field in which ‘exceptions’ or ‘anomalies’, in Kuhn’s terminology, 
appear to be devastating for the dominant thought style (mainstream neoclassical 
                                                            
1 Thomas S. Kuhn in his foreword to the English edition of Fleck’s Entstehung und Entwicklung einer 
wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact) calls it “a damaging 
metaphor, for it reinforces the impression that, in the absence of social pressure, illusion might have 
been avoided” (Kuhn 1979: X). Actually, if ‘absence of social pressure’ refers not to the ‘thought 
compulsion’ necessary for any thought collective but to the inadmissibility of more than one thought 
style at a time, the impression appears to be well founded. 
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economics), yet do not trigger a ‘thought style transformation’ (Denkstilumwandlungen) 
but, if anything, merely ‘thought style supplementations’ (Denkstilergänzungen) or 
‘thought style extensions’ (Denkstilerweiterung): labour market economics in general and 
the introduction of minimum wages in particular.     
3. The impact of minimum wages on employment and the dominant ‘thought 
style’ 
The dominant neoclassical labour market theory is based on the premise that the labour 
market can basically be analysed in the same way as any other commodity market. That 
is to say that supply of and demand for labour (services) follow the same utility 
maximisation prinicples as on any other market: households provide labour (services) 
according to the optimisation principle of exchanging leisure time (which provides utility, 
and thus any offer of labour services reducing leisure time implies disutility) for income 
(which compensates for the loss of utility) up to the point where the disutility of an extra 
unit of sacrificed leisure time is merely compensated for by the utility of the extra unit of 
income gained; i.e. marginal disutility of labour supply simply equals the real wage rate 
as the price of the extra unit of labour supply. In a similar fashion, the microeconomics 
of firms’ demand for labour align the utility of an extra unit of labour with the cost of that 
extra unit; i.e. the marginal productivity simply equals the real wage rate as the price of 
the extra unit of labour demand. As the marginal disutility of labour supply is assumed to 
increase with each unit of labour supplied, the ordinary labour supply curve rises with the 
real wage rate. And since the labour demand curve falls as the marginal productivity of 
labour is assumed to fall under the conditions of a ‘well-behaved’ production function, 
both curves will intersect at the real wage rate which equalises the marginal productivity 
of the last unit of labour demanded with the marginal disutility of the last unit of labour 
supplied – hence we get a cleared labour market at the ‘equilibrium wage rate’ and full 
employment in the sense that every unit of labour supplied at the equilibrium wage rate 
will find employment. Unemployment can only be ‘voluntary’ in the sense that 
households may ask a price (real wage rate) for their labour supply which lies above the 
market-clearing level (i.e. above the marginal productivity of the unit of labour if it were 
employed additionally) and cannot, therefore, be paid by the firms unless they accept 
losses (in the short term and bankruptcy in the long run).  
This rather technical approach to a very social mechanism follows the dominant thought 
style (‘mainstream economics’) of translating any social process in the economic sphere 
into an exchange procedure in a market place – the ‘pre- or proto-idea’ of mainstream 
economics is thus market exchange in order to increase the welfare of the market 
participants involved by using advantages of specialisation (‘economies of scope’) and 
by exploiting favourable exchange opportunities based on initial endowments. But ‘the 
market’, i.e. market exchange, is not only seen technically as a coordination mechanism 
(harmonising diverging interests) but also ideologically as a superior device for creating 
a ‘spontaneous order’ which reduces social power to symmetrical exchange relations and 
provides (pareto-)optimal outcomes which can be accepted without the need to determine 
collective objectives such as a ‘common good’ or general welfare –here superiority refers 
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to allocative and productive efficiency in comparison to an alternative coordination 
mechanism such as a central plan. ‘The market’ and its defence against other coordination 
mechanisms therefore becomes a constitutive element of mainstream economics not only 
because it promises superior economic outcomes but also because it is based on the 
preservation and defence of property rights and, implicitly, a given distribution of wealth 
(initial endowments). How much the idea of market exchange as the constituent of 
economic activity analysed by the economics profession permeates the dominant thought 
style – and thus creates a collective mood of the thought collective – is illustrated by the 
fact that the object of inquiry is widely dubbed ‘market economy’. The classical political 
economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries used the term ‘capitalism’ instead, 
which does not yet convey the message of market exchange as central and definitive to 
their object of inquiry. Moreover, the centrality of market exchange for analysing and 
modelling economic activities is strengthened and reinforced by society’s attitude 
towards markets and market outcomes: the more ‘market conforming’ or ‘market 
oriented’ a society and its cultural norms, the stronger the collective mood of the thought 
collective of scientists in general and of economists in particular – thus establishing a 
strong thought compulsion which excludes the possibility of any other basic constituent 
such as power relations (as in Marxian economics) or nominal obligations (as in post-
Keynesian economics).2 
The mandatory tenacity of a thought style based on its ‘thought compulsion’ may turn it 
into a ‘harmony of deception’ if the scientific discipline involved does not allow a 
plurality of thought styles to coexist. This, again, may be the case when the scientific 
claim of the discipline is to provide ‘truth’ in a singular form (and to reject pluralism as 
relativism) and when thought collectives are in a position to set the methodological, 
epistemological and, particularily importantly, the ontological standards for the discipline 
as a whole. This appears to be exactly the case in economics, where a handful of US elite 
university departments are bestowed with a level of economic, social, institutional and 
cultural capital (in a Bourdieuian sense) which puts them in a position to play key roles 
in offering the standards which the peculiar ‘market for economic ideas’ requests (see 
Heise 2016). Fourcade/Ollion/Algan (2015: 91) therefore conclude:  
Economics occupies a unique position among academic disciplines. It is characterized by 
far-reaching scientific claims linked to the use of formal methods; the tight management 
of the discipline from the top down; high market demand for services, particularly from 
powerful and wealthy parties.  
Through institutionalised incentive systems (rankings, journal hierarchies, third-party 
funding as ‘objective’ quality measurements), the US market-oriented collective mood 
has turned into a worldwide thought compulsion which leaves almost no room for other 
                                                            
2 Marion Fourcade shows that a market-oriented collective mood is particularly strong in the USA, 
while in other countries (such as the UK or France) the collective mood is (or, rather, has been) more 
state-oriented or public-minded: “The American political distrust of centralized political power has a 
natural corollary in the celebration of the market. […] The Sherman Act implied that markets are not 
simply the structure of the American economy: they are its law (Fourcade 2009: 35 ff.; italics in 
original).  
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thought styles to flourish (see e.g. Heise/Thieme 2016, Chavance/Labrousse 2018, 
Corsi/D’Ippoliti/Zacchia 2018).                  
Notwithstanding the glorification of markets in mainstream economics, its smooth 
functioning rests on some assumptions which may not necessarily hold in the real world: 
perfect competition, perfect information and foresight, absence of transaction cost and 
the absence of political interference. With respect to the labour market, myriad theories 
have been put forward on how the real-world refutation of any of these assumptions can 
explain what appears to be – contrary to the prediction of perfect markets – a common 
feature of highly developed economies: lasting mass unemployment. Monopoly union, 
right-to-manage, insider-outsider and NAIRU3 theories reject the assumption of perfect 
competition in labour markets, and efficiency wage theories point to the fact that wage 
contracts are incomplete in the face of imperfect knowledge and information. Job search 
and menu cost theories refer to positive transaction costs involved in real-world labour 
markets. The result is always a deviation of the market outcome from market clearing at 
full employment level due to restrictions either on the demand or on the supply side of 
the labour market. Moreover, once social policies or legal restrictions render the 
assumption of the ‘absence of political interference’futile, reservation or minimum wages 
will provide the same explanation for unemployment: the real wage rate turns out to be 
too high for full employment. In terms of Ludwik Fleck’s philosophy, all such ‘theories 
of unemployment’ can be seen as thought style supplementations and extensions to the 
initial ‘theory of the non-existence of involuntary unemployment’, yet they remain 
compatible and commensurable with it4 and thus rather stabilise the initial thought 
collective than spark a veritable thought style transformation.    
It is in this sense that the minimum wage has become part of almost every textbook on 
macroeconomics: if it is set at a level above the ‘equilibrium wage rate’ – and a minimum 
wage below that level would clearly make no sense – it will cause unemployment (see 
e.g. Blanchard/Illing 2017: 339; Bofinger 2015: 340; Altmann 2009: 373f.).5 The 
obviousness of this result – merely the exact quantity of unemployment remains to be 
empirically settled – is illustrated by the fact that unemployment on this theoretical basis 
is typically termed ‘minimum wage unemployment’ irrespective of what or who 
determines the minimum wage: it could as much be initiated by the trade unions via 
encompassing collective bargaining agreements as simply being statutorily set by the law 
maker.         
4. Empirical minimum wages research and the introduction of minimum wages in 
Germany 
Academic economics considers itself to be a ‘positive science’; i.e. it claims to 
                                                            
3 NAIRU stand for Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. 
4 As a mainstream referee to a paper of mine once wrote: ‘No matter how you look at it, unemployment 
ultimately always turns out to be a problem of excessively high real wages’ – mainstream heuristics 
does not allow for any other interpretation.  
5 I will concentrate on the German literature – textbooks in this case – only because Germany and the 
introduction of minimum wages in Germany in 2015 form the case studied in this paper.  However, 
the same is true for the more influential American textbooks; see Dolar (2013). 
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theoretically explain what ‘is’, not what ‘should be’. Therefore, theoretical modelling in 
economics always has to face the reality test of empirical falsificationism: theoretical 
statements can be accepted as establishing ‘truth’ as long as they are not rejected by 
rigorous empirical testing. There is a long tradition in Labour Market Economics of doing 
exactly this: testing the effects of minimum wages on sectoral and overall employment, 
(wage) income distribution, and collective bargaining, among other things. With respect 
to the employment effect of minimum wages, the picture remains perplexing:  
Economists have conducted hundreds of studies of the employment impact of the 
minimum wage. Summarizing those studies is a daunting task, but two recent meta-
studies analyzing the research conducted since the early 1990s concludes that the 
minimum wage has little or no discernible effect on the employment prospects of 
low-wage workers. (Schmitt 2013: 22) 
These findings are in stark contrast to mainstream neoclassical labour market theory 
exposed above. How does the thought collective (of mainstream economists) react to such 
an apparent falsification of its thought style? Will we experience a transformation of 
thought style which brings the ideas back in line with the facts? Or how will the thought 
compulsion serve to keep the thought style intact? The introduction of statutory minimum 
wages in Germany in 2015 provides an interesting basis for study. However, before we 
examine the German case, let us extract potential reactions from a review of the 
international literature: 1) a common reaction, of course, is simply to ignore contradicting 
empirical evidence altogether. 2) Many studies avoid addressing the question of overall, 
economy-wide employment effects by merely focussing on sectoral, i.e. partial impacts. 
In doing so, they can demonstrate the expected negative employment effects in the very 
sectors in which sectorial minimum wages were introduced and thus avoid conceding 
‘exceptions’ or ‘anomalies’. 3) With the seminal papers of Card/Krueger (1995) and 
Manning (2003), the common assumption of perfect competition in labour markets has 
been replaced by the assumption of monopsonistic labour markets, i.e. the idea that 
regionally, employers may not be faced with competing employers for labour (the 
‘industry town’) or the idea that transaction cost (job search cost, moving cost, loss of 
firm-specific human capital, etc.) may give employers wage-setting power (pseudo-
monopsony) even in the face of complete competition. As smartish as this thought style 
supplementation is, it is not without problems: truly monopsonistic competition appears 
to be rather rare in modern advanced economies and, therefore, of only marginal 
importance. Moreover, to take the argument seriously, the introduction of minimum 
wages will curtail the wage-setting power of monopsonistic firms and, if we assume 
ordinary labour supply behaviour, increase employment compared to a situation without 
a minimum wage. This, again, would not be consonant with empirical evidence. And 
although the introduction of transaction cost definitely renders the theoretical approach 
more realistic and explains some limited the wage-setting power of firms, negative 
employment effects can only be avoided if the minimum wage is set very low indeed: 
once the minimum wage exceeds the equilibrium wage rate of the least qualified worker 
by more than the margin given by transaction cost, employment losses would have to be 
expected. To summarise, the artificiality of the arguments put forward are a clear indicator 
of the working of thought compulsion: stabilising a thought style confronted with 
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empirical evidence to the contrary. 
For long time, minimum wages sparked little attention in German academic economics: 
the principle of the autonomy of collective bargaining granted to the social partners 
evoked negative responses on the part of employers’ organisations to the same degree as 
trade unions whenever the topic of introducing minimum wages arose on the political 
agenda. It was only from the early 2000s onwards, when it became ever more apparent 
that collective bargaining agreements no longer covered most employees at the lower end 
of the wage scale and (wage) income inequality and poverty rates increased markedly, 
that minimum wages became more topical. The discussion was fuelled mainly by the big 
policy-oriented German think tanks such as the ifo-Institut or the Deutsche Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) and official counselling institutions such as the Institut für 
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) of the German Labour Agency and the 
Sachverständigenrat (SVR – Council of Economic Experts).  
The latter adressed the question of minimum wages as early as 2006, when the 
mainstream majority of experts6 clearly rejected the introduction of a minimum wage in 
Germany on the basis of expected negative employment effects as predicted by the 
ordinary neoclassical labour market theory. They did mention empirical evidence to the 
contrary, yet refused to accept such evidence was of guiding importance for Germany, 
since it was allegedly based on economies (mainly the USA and the UK) which are 
different from the German economy and where labour markets are more flexible than in 
Germany (see Sachverständigenrat 2006: 401ff.). However, they failed to explain why 
these qualifications matter, but mention labour market monopsony as a potential 
argument in favour of minimum wages. Again, they rejected this approach due to the 
argument outlined above: only very low minimum wages (much lower than the mooted 
hourly minimum wage of €7.50) could claim neutral or even positive employment effects. 
Interestingly, in a minority votum, one expert pointed to  empirical evidence to the 
contrary in order to back his pro-minimum wage position. Yet he made no effort to fortify 
his adversarial position with a theoretical argument. In the editorial revision of his 
textbook on macroeconomics (Bofinger 2015: 159ff.), this expert added the monopsony 
model of labour markets to justify minimum wages – the earlier editions only mentioned 
mainstream minimum wage unemployment. Unfortunately, he neither bothered to explain 
the difference between theoretical prediction (increase in employment) and empirical 
evidence (neutral employment effect) nor did he make any effort to prove the existence 
of monopsonistic labour markets in Germany. When the government finally decided to 
introduce a minimum wage in 2015, the Council of Economic Experts simply replicated 
its earlier judgment in its 2013 and 2014 annual reports (see Sachverständigenrat 2013; 
Sachverständigenrat 2014).     
The ifo-Institut was even more explicit in its compliance to the ordinary mainstream 
                                                            
6 The German council of economic experts (SVR) comprises 5 ‘economic experts’ (mainly economics 
professors). 3 of them are nominated by the German government, one is nominated by the German 
employers’ organisation and one is nominated by the German trade unions. In most cases, 3 + 1 experts 
are from a mainstream neoclassical background while 1 (the trade union’s nominee) has a more 
Keynesian background.   
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labour market approach by resorting to citing the alleged analogy between apple and car 
markets on the one hand and labour markets on the other (see Ragnitz/Thum 2008): if the 
price is too high, there will be a quantity reaction, i.e. if the minium wage is set above the 
equilibrium wage rate, employment will fall and unemployment will rise – merely the 
strength of this reaction may be questionable. The higher the employment elasticity of the 
(real) wage rate, the higher the negative impact will be. According to the estimates used 
by the ifo-Institut, even low minimum wages will cause considerable employment losses 
in Germany. The study mentions conflicting empirical evidence only in passing and 
rejects it outright by simply claiming a lack of suitable accuracy for Germany. 
In a common declaration of the six publicly financed economic think tanks7 and the 
research institut of the German employers’ organisation Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft 
(IW) and the privately funded Institut für die Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA) (see DIW et al. 
2008), the introduction of a minimum wage is rejected on the grounds that it will damage 
employment to a considerable extent. Again, empirical evidence to the contrary is played 
down and other theoretical constructions such as the monopsonistic labour market even 
entirely ignored.      
The Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) of the German Labour Agency 
is the only major research institute in Germany that was slightly less critical of the 
introduction of a statutory minimum wage (see Möller/König 2008). However, this was 
not due to different theoretical reasoning but simply to a different weighting of empirical 
evidence against theoretical prediction – highlighting the applied research focus of the 
institute. The trick was to point to the inconclusive empirical evidence and to claim that 
the theoretical prediction is also inconclusive once the ordinary neoclassical (competitive) 
labour market model is supplemented by a monopsonistic labour market model.8 
Moreover, it was argued that as long as the minimum wage is kept low – close to the 
bottom end of the wage scale – negative employment effects can be contained. Clearly, 
in substance there is not much difference to the lines of argument pursued by the critics 
of a minimum wage. 
After the political debate culminated – despite the strong resistance from German 
academic economics – in the resolution to finally introduce a statutory minimum wage in 
Germany in 2015, Knabe et al. (2014) provided probably the most comprehensive study 
on the potential employment effects. They conclude: 
The introduction of a comprehensive, statutory minimum wage of € 8.50is a big 
experiment which entails high social risks. The objective of this review article is to 
evaluate these risks on the basis of existing theoretical and empirical literature. The 
result is that neither theoretical research nor empirical work from other countries 
provide the all-clear. 
Arguments for a neglible effect on employment all rest without exception on 
                                                            
7 Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), ifo-Institut, Hamburger Weltwirtschaftsarchiv 
(HWWA), Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Institut für 
Weltwirtschaft (IfW) and Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH). 
8 Of course, conflicting theoretical predictions are translated into inconclusiveness of theoretical 
prediction – which is clearly not the same thing. 
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theoretical and empirical work on moderate minimum wage increases. Up to 2015, 
for example, presumably 1.1 million employees will earn less than 5 euros per hour. 
For these people, the introduction of a minimum wage will cause their wages to 
incease by 70 percent and more and thus these arguments cannot be applied. (Knabe 
2014: 153, own translation) 
They estimate considerable job losses in Germany of 910,717 on the basis of a standard 
neoclassical model and, interestingly, an only marginally  lower figure of 425,676 if a 
monopsonistic labour market is assumed.9 The former result is entirely in line with 
exactly the same theoretical reasoning which empirical evidence has not supported. The 
latter result appears to contradict the monopsony model; however, the monopsony 
model’s prediction of an overall gain in employment rests on the assumption of very low 
minimum wages. Once this assumption is dropped, job losses – although lower in number 
– are inevitable even under (pseudo-)monopsonistic conditions. And it is precisely this 
argumentative turn – that the minimum wage of € 8.50 to be introduced statutorily in 
Germany in 2015 is far too high for positive or neutral employment effects – which is 
also directed against the empirical literature: the wage increase in many sectors is far 
higher than has ever been empirically tested and therefore empirical evidence to the 
contrary is considered inappropriate for the German case. 
Summarising the debate, we find all the elements of “enduring resistance” (Fleck 1979: 
27) predicted by Ludwik Fleck to anything that contradicts the considerable negative 
effects of such a regulatory step: (1) For most studies and their authors, a contradiction 
of the outcome of mainstream neoclassical labour market theory with respect to wage 
setting above the equilibrium wage rate is simply unthinkable! (2) Although scientific 
credibility and integrity precludes ignoring conflicting theoretical and empirical evidence 
outright (‘not see or keep secret’ as Fleck puts it),10 (3) in most cases it is either played 
down or rejected as not appropriate for the case under investigation, i.e. “laborious efforts 
are made to explain an exception” (Fleck 1979: 27). (4) Finally, even those studies that 
appear not to be in line with the predictions of the mainstream thought collective – i.e. 
those that favour minimum wages – do not refute the dominant thought style altogether 
but, rather, add ideas to or change assumptions of that dominant thought style, thereby 
triggering ‘thought style supplementations’ or ‘thought style extensions’. It should be 
noted that such ‘supplementations’ and ‘extensions’ have been easily re-integrated into 
the original ‘thought style’ by claiming their limited validity and commensurability with 
it11. 
                                                            
9 Other studies suggest quite similar negative employment effects: Henzel/Engelhardt (2014) expect 
job losses of 857,000, Arni et al. (2014) estimate a decline in employment of 570,000 – differences 
are basically due to different assumptions about the wage elasticity of labour demand. 
10 Nevertheless, the joint appeal of the presidents and directors of the important German economic 
think tanks, admittedly not a scientific document, does not even bother to mention the construction of 
a monopsonistic labour market as a potential theoretical counter-argument; see DIW et al. (2008).  
11 It should also be noted that there were (and are) alternative approaches available which would 
constitute veritable ‚thought style transformations‘ (see e.g.Herr/Kazandziska 2011; 
Herr/Kazandziska/Mahnkopf-Praprotnik 2009) – however, they did not receive any attention and 
remained entirely marginalised.   
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5. ‘Thought compulsion’ and scientific misapprehension – a conclusion 
Di It has been argued in this paper that – on the basis of the sociology and philosophy of 
science of Ludwik Fleck – every thought collective needs to create a certain thought 
compulsion in order to (temporarily) stabilise. However, there is a trade-off between the 
stability of a thought collective and the apprehensiveness of a thought style in that the 
inherent rebuttal of theoretical and empirical evidence to the contrary may eventually 
become a ‘harmony in deception’ and thus may harm scientific progress. 
The introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany in 2015 and the preceding 
academic discussion reveal the resilience of mainstream labour market theory based on a 
thought compulsion of the thought collective: although there was abundant empirical 
evidence demonstrating that neither the standard (competitive) labour market model nor 
the peculiar approach of a (pseudo)monopsontistic labour market can be brought in line 
with real-world labour market outcomes in the face of minimum wages, the mainstream 
academic community in Germany adhered to those models and, at least in its vast 
majority, fervently rejected minimum wages as being economically harmful. Only a small 
minority supported minimum wage legislation – however this was not based on a rejection 
of the dominant ‘thought style’ but on a rather unconvincing bias towards empirical 
evidence (and, possibly, on ideological motivations).             
The political actors in Germany did not follow the recommendations of the majority 
position and thus allowed an economic (and, of course, social) experiment: will Germany 
suffer a heavy blow to employment (the standard labour market model and monopsony 
labour market model in the interpretation of the majority of mainstream economists) or 
will employment even rise (as in the interpretation of the monopsony model by a minority 
of mainstream economists)? Or will the effect be rather negligible, as international 
empirical evidence suggests – putting the accuracy of the dominant thought style in 
doubt? 
Without exception, all studies on the effects of the introduction of a statutory minimum 
wage on employment in Germany with their different methods – the minimum wage act 
codified research to be conducted concomitantly – conclude that overall employment 
effects are negligible (and more reliably so the more time has elapsed since the 
introduction of minimum wages; see e.g. Mindestlohnkommission 2018, Bossler/Möller 
2018, Caliendo et al. 2017, Bonin et al. 2018, Heise/Pusch 2018; Zilius/Bruttel 2018).12 
There appears to be a negative impact on so-called ‘mini-jobs’13 and more so in those 
branches that are more exposed to the minimum wage than the average, but this seems to 
be almost entirely compensated for by an increase in regular jobs 
(‘sozialversicherungspflichtige Arbeitsplätze’). Certainly, unemployment has not 
                                                            
12 Interestingly, most of these studies are provided by the very economic think tanks that 
rigorously opposed a minimum wage upon the advent of such legislation.  
13 These are jobs in which employees do not earn more than € 450 per month and are exempt from 
social insurance contributions. 
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increased due to minimum wages but there have been a slight (and desired) shift of jobs 
from precarious to ‘normal’ and a slight sectoral change.  
Taking these results seriously, we must consider not only neoclassical labour market 
theory to be ‘in crisis’ (to borrow Kuhn’s terminology) but also neoclassical (market) 
theory in general, since most neoclassical economists claim labour markets and other 
commodity and factor markets to be similar with respect to their ‘laws of motion’. 
Therefore, if the ordinary price–quantity correlations and causalities in labour markets 
appear not to work, why should they nevertheless work in other markets? It will be 
interesting to see whether and how14 mainstream neoclassical (labour) market theory 
manages to survive this blow to its very foundations as the dominant thought style. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
14 One line of defence appears to be to point to other ‘adjustment channels’ of firms rather than 
quantity reactions: e.g. price or productivity changes (see e.g. Zilius/Bruttel 2018: 716 f., Schmitt 
2013: 11ff.). However, the dubious nature of the logical rigour of such ‘adjustment channels’ 
suggests another set of ‘laborious efforts to explain an exception’. 
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